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EDITORIAL NOTE
THE DAVIS WILL CASE - A STUDY IN
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
"The notion of a contingent remainder," according to Chief
Justice Wiles, "is a matter of a good deal of nicety".' His-
torically, it would seem that remainders of one sort or another
have been sanctioned in the common law ever since the reign of
King John,2 though the more precise distinction between vested
I Parkhurst v. Smith, Willes 327, 337, 125 Eng. Rep. R. 1197, 1202 (H. L.
1741). The learned judge added, ". ... and if I should trouble you with
all that is said in the books concerning contingent remainders and the in-
stances that are put of such contingent remainders I am afraid it would
rather tend to puzzle than enlighten the ease."
2 HUNTER, FINES (1835) vol. 1, 34, citing a fine of 1192, granting to Mary
for life; "reversion" after her death to her son Hugh, in special tail;
"reversion", in default of issue, to her son Stephen, in special tail.
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and contingent remainders was scarcely recognized by medieval
conveyancers 3 Indeed,'in the fourteenth century, a remainder to
the heirs of a living person was thought simply to be void,4 for
feudal services could never be owed by an unascertained personA
Not until 1453 did common law courts permit such an ordinary
type of contingent estate,6 and the validity of remainders depend-
ing on other contingencies awaited the gradual development of
judge-made law during the next hundred years.7  It was left to
property lawyers in the Stuart reigns, beginning with Coke8 and
ending perhaps with Sir Orlando Bridgman,' to ascertain and
phrase the rules which were subsequently to govern this inalien-
able yet destructible future interest in land, so frequently en-
countered.10
Still the precise frontier between vested and contingent re-
mainders was never measured off clearly in the next decades:
there was no bright line of demarcation as to what constituted the
latter's-scope. A remainder to an unborn or unascertained person,
or one subject to a condition precedent, was contingent as a rule
of property;" and that simple Austinian definition worked well in
elementary cases. When courts entered border territory where,
for example, the contingency was stated both as a condition prece-
dent and as a condition subsequent,1 2 or even where there was a
gift over in default of the exercise of a power of appointment,"
not to mention the curious contingent remainder with a double
SMaitland, Bemainders After Conditional Fees (1890) 6 L. Q. REv. 22, 23.
4 Cf. Y. B. 18 Edw. 31, f. 578 (1325); Y. B. 10 Edw. III, Michs. No. 8(1336); Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, Trin. No. 14 (1410). LITTL=oN, TENUREs (1481)
§ 721, reflected these views.
5 Per Bereford, J., in Y. B. 2, 3 Edw. II (S. S.) 4 (1309).6 FIZH ERT, ARRIDGmENT, tit. Feffements, No. 99, citing Hill. 32 Hen.
VI (a decision not printed in the Black Letter Year Books).7 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAM I!w (1927) 68.
8 Co. Litt. (1628) note to § 721.
Bridgman invented, inter ala, the device of the trust to preserve con-
tingent remainders. See BRmI15GAs, CONVLTANCES (1690) 186-187.
10 These interests became increasingly common with the formulation of the
rule that a limitation which can take effect as a contingent remainder must
take effect as such, and cannot be construed to be a springing or shifting use,
or an executory devise. See Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wms. Saunders 380, 388,
85 Eng. Rep. R. 1181, 1192 (1670). Presumably, this rule still holds, to-day.
1 iFEAnNE, CONTINmGE REAnDEas (10th ed. 1844) vol. 1, 5-9.
12 Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 132, 83 Eng. Rep. R. 614 (1683).
13 Leonard LoviesIs Case, 10 Co. 78a, 85a, 77 Eng. Rep. R. 1043,1052 (1613);
Walpole v. Lord Conway, Barnard. Ch. 153, 27 Eng. Rep. R. 593 (1740).
Contra, and present-day law, Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Yes. Sr. 174, 27 Eng.
Rep. R. 965 (1748); Doe d. Willis v. Martin, 4 T. R. 39, 100 Eng. Rep. R.
882 (1790).
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aspect,"4 - it was in truth a veritable no-man's land. Deprived
of the pole-star of any expressed intent on the part of the
testator,0 decisions floundered badly' while rules of construction
were painfully being formulated, as the precedents slowly accumu-
lated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.17  The amelio-
rating presumption in favor of vesting' 8 helped materially in this
task, but the safest course proved ultimately to be one of negatively
defining the issue. A remainder was vested in its owner, so it came
to be held, when, throughout its continuance, there existed always
the right to the immediate possession, whenever and however the
preceding freehold estates might determine: all else was con-
tingent.1  One found a statutory vagary now and then, 20 Chancel-
lor Kent himself once being misled by such legislative phrasing.21
Albeit, modern text-writers have empirically assumed, perhaps
unwisely, that difficulties of determining whether a remainder be
vested or contingent have thus largely been solved.22
Presumably, then, there should be no unusual hardship at the
present time in applying these settled principles to any ordinary
14Loddington v. Xime, 1 Salk. 224, 91 Eng. Rep. R. 198 (1695), holding
improperly that no limitations after a contingent remainder in fee simple ab-
solute can ever be vested. For a modern decision to this same effect, see Ed-
miston v. Donovan, 300 Ill. 521, 133 N. E. 237 (1921).
16 See Garth v. Baldwin, 2 Yes. Sr. 646, 28 Eng. Rep. R. 412 (1755), per
Lord Hardwicke, holding that, in a court of equity, construction of limita-
tions in trust must occur according to the ordinary legal rules of construction,
unless the intent of the testator appeared by declaration plain. Normally, in
these cases there is no such coruscating evidence.
16 E. g., Doe d. Roake v. Nowell, 1 M. & S. 327, 105 Eng. Rep. R. 123
(1813), criticized in FEARm, op. cit. supra n. 11, vol. 1, 177-179.
17 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGiaSH LAw (1926) vol. VIII, 84-104.
18 See Duffield v. Duffield, 1 Dow. & C. 268, 311, 6 Eng. Rep. R. 525, 542
(1827-1829), as illustrative of the vigorous modern rule, I. . . . in constru-
ing devises, that all estates are to be holden to be vested, except estates in the
devise of which a condition precedent to the vesting is so clearly expressed
that the courts cannot treat them as vested without deciding in direct opposi-
tion to the terms of the will." Per Lord Eldon, "I hope this will be a lead-
ing case."
19 GRAY, TnE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 101.
20 For example, New York thus defines a remainder as vested, "when there
is a person in being who would have an immediate right to the possession of
the property, on the determination of all the intermediate or precedent es-
tates." NEw Yox REAL PROPERTY LAW (McKINNEY's CoNs. LAWS, Book
49, § 40). Thus, in New York, since the abolition of the Rule in Shelley's
Case, a remainder to heirs, following a life estate to the ancestor, is vested.
Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66 (1869), reversing the reasoning but not the re-
sult in s. c., 40 Barb. 488 (1863).
21 Kent said this incorrect New York definition "appears to be accurately
and fully expressed." 4 KENT, COMIMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896) 202.
22 1 TIFTANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §§ 135-139.
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problem in future interests.23 Hence, Davis Trust Companj v.
Elkins24 must be regarded as the exception to such a bland as-
sumption of ready solution, insofar as it raises varied and vexing
issues. In that case, the testator,25 while arranging a lengthy but
careful disposition of his vast estate among his relatives and bene-
ficiaries, 26 set up a trust of personalty" for specified issue. In
order that his three named children might "have an assured in-
come during their lives," he made them equitable tenants in
common for life, subject to a restraint on alienation and without
power of anticipation as to the income from the respective shares.
28
Thereafter, with the purpose that "some provisions" might be
made "for those dependent upon them at their death," the testator
provided that "at the death of any of his said children," each
respective share was to pass to the "children" of any such de-
ceased child of the testator.2 9  Yet to this gift in favor of his
grandchildren, per stirpes, he added a postponement of enjoyment,
stipulating that the income should be devoted to their welfare
until they respectively reached the age of twenty-five, 0 when the
corpus of the fund would be turned over. But if any of the
testator's children left no children nor child, then and in such
event the remainder in the particular share, (after the equitable
23 A leading American jurist has remarked that there is seldom a dissenting
opinion in a modem decision, on the issue of whether the remainder is vested
or contingent.
24175 S. E. 611 (W. Va. 1934).
25 Henry G. Davis, who died in March 1916.
20 The will, executed under date of August 24, 1915, contained thirty-one
separate provisions as to the distribution of the estate.
27 Recent case-law, as well as modern statutory provisions, recognizes the
existence of remainders in personalty. See Evans v. Walker, 3 Ch. D. 211
(1876); W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 9.
28 While this provision is in the nature of a spendthrift trust, it will be
noted there is no specific prohibition against involuntary alienation, e. g., by
adverse judgment. Cf. Bruceton Bank v. Alexander, 83 W. Va. 573, 98 S. E.
804 (1919). Moreover, no discretion has been confided in the trustee as to
payment of income, nor is there any gift over on insolvency, two provisions
commonly met with in other jurisdictions. Presumably, however, such a pro-
vision would today be execution-proof in West Virginia: see Hoffman v. Beltz-
hoover, 71 W. Va. 72, 76 S. E. 968 (1912), and W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
c. 36, art. 1, § 18.
29 The language of the will contains a clear gift of the personalty in fee
simple, subject to the condition subsequent. Had the trust res been realty,
present-day legislation would have obviated any necessity of the use of the
word "heirs", in order to create the fee in the children: W. VA. REV. CoDE
(1931) e. 36, art. 1, § 11. Of course, even at common law, this rigid re-
quirement was overlooked where the devise used equivalent language.
so For discussion of the problem of remote postponement of enjoyment of a
vested estate, see KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (1920) §§ 732-741.
4
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life estate during the tenancy in common), would go to the legal
heirs of this child of the testator.3 1
The three named children 2 of the testator survived him and
took their respective shares for life. At the testator's death, one
daughter33 then had five living children, all over the age of twenty-
five, (which was the postponement limit). The other daughter
then had four living children, and the testator's son, two, - all of
these grandchildren being less than twenty-five. Subsequently,
in the life-time of the elder daughter, (Mrs. Hallie D. Elkins),
three of her children died,3 4 one of the deceased grandchildren
(Blaine Elkins), leaving a son, (Stephen B. Elkins, III.), him
surviving. The two remaining grandchildren, (Mrs. Katharine
Elkins Hitt and Davis Elkins), as well as the great-grandson,
(Stephen B. Elkins, III.), were living at the death of this elder
daughter. The present suit was then brought to determine the
respective rights of these three parties.33
31 The upper court (175 S. E. 611, 614) observed that this provision demon-
strated the testator's concern over possible grandchildren of the life tenant
and his desire to provide for them, "for certainly the grandchildren, if any,
would be the sole legal heirs in the event named." With due respect, it is
believed that interpretation is unfounded. It is just as probable the testator
thought there would be no such grandchildren of the life tenant, if the lat-
ter died without leaving children. The remote hypothesis of grandchildren
of the life tenant taking by purchase can hardly have entered the testator's
mind. Moreover, a gift to the "legal heirs" of the life tenant could never
be 'confined simply to his issue.
32 Mrs. Hallie D. Elkins, Mrs. Grace D. Lee and John T. Davis.
33Mrs. Elkins had five children, - Mrs. Katherine Elkins Hitt; Blaine
Elkins, (the father of Stephen B. Elkins, III); Richard Elkins; Stephen B.
Elkins; and Davis Elkins.
34 Richard and Stephen, of the children, predeceased without issue their
life tenant mother; Blaine, also predeceasing, left his son Stephen, 11I, sur-
viving.
35 The precise language of the will provision is, as follows:
"XV. In order that my children, Hallie D. Elkins, Grace Davis Lee and
John T. Davis, may have an assured income during their lives, and that some
provision may be made for those dependent upon them at their death, I give,
devise and bequeath to the Davis Trust Company, One Million Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars to be held by it in trust for my aforesaid children in equal
proportions, that is to say, Five Hundred Thousand Dollars for each, the
revenue therefrom to be paid to them semi-annually during their lives; and at
the death of any of my said children, I give and bequeath his or her share
in equal proportions to his or her children, the income or revenue therefrom
to be devoted to their welfare until they respectively reach the age of twenty-
live years when they are to receive from my estate their share of the principal of
the fund; but if any of my said children leaves no children nor child then his
or her share is to go to his or her legal heirs. The intent of the foregoing
provision is that a portion of my estate shall be held in trust so that it can-
not be spent, sold or given away by my said children, and they, therefore,
shall have no power to sell, transfer, or in anyway dispose of their interest in
said trust fund, or of the income or proceeds thereof, in advance of receiving
the same. The trust fund of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars for
5
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The will must of course be construed as of the time of the
testator's death, taking into account the factual situation as it
then existed and disregarding all subsequent events.80 So con-
strued, the state of the title to the trust of personalty became, as
indicated above, an equitable life estate in each of the testator's
children, by way of tenancy in common, without cross remainders
either expressly or by implication.8 7 On the death of each child,
the respective undivided interest passed, per stirpes, to the life
tenant's children, Zthe testator's grandchildren), in the nature of
a remainder to a class. 8 Obviously, the class in each instance
would close on the death of the life tenant:"0 no testamentary
language existed to dispense with the common law presumption
that each life tenant would be capable of issue up to the moment
of death.40  Each class of grandchildren might accordingly open
up, in order to let in after-born grandchildren, (born between the
death of the testator and that of the life-tenant). The postpone-
ment of enjoyment until the age of twenty-five, extending thus
possibly for more than twenty-one years after lives in being, would
be invalid;41 and each grandchild on reaching maturity could take
his fractional interest in the undivided share, after the life estate
which provision is hereby made may consist of Coal and Coke Railway Com-
pany bonds, or other bonds, stocks or other property, at a fair valuation, as
my Executors may determine, and is to be managed and its accounts kept
under their direction by the Davis Trust Company."
38W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 41, art. 3, § 1: "A will shall be construed,
with reference to the estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it
had been executed immediately before the death of the tesfator, unless a con-
trary intention shall appear by the will." Cf. Southern v. Wollaston, 16 Beav.
276, 51 Eng. Rep. R. 785 (1852). The chief difficulty in the present case is
the feeling one cannot escape that both trial and appellate courts construed
the will in the light of subsequent events.
87 Cf. Lazier v. Lazier, 35 W.. Va. 567, 14 S. E. 148 (1891).
38 See the definition of "gift to a'class" in Prichard v. Prichard, 83 W.
Va. 652, 98 S. E. 877 (1919).
89Ayton v. Ayton, I Cox, Ch. Cas. 327, 29 Eng. Rep. R, 1188 (1787);
Middleton v. Messenger, 5 Ves. 136, 31 Eng. Rep. R. 511 (1799).
40 The authorities are collected in Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 394. The
upper court, in this connection, said (175 S. E. 611, 614): "By using the
words 'those dependent upon' Hallie D. Elkins, the testator in all likelihood,
knowing that his daughter would probably have no nore children and that
those of her children in life were over 25 years of age and in the nature of
things not dependent, contemplated the applicatio i of those words to the
child of a deceased child of Mrs. Elkins." (Italics supplied.) Not only is
the court's statement in opposition to the norinal presumption of capacity to
bear issue, but it ignores also the fact that all of the children of the other
two life tenants were under the age of twenty-five. Surely, "those dependent
upon" may possibly have referred to the children of these other two, as well
as to any after-born children of Mrs. Elkins.
41The so-called "New Rule" against remote postponement of enjoyment
of a vested estate in an indestructible trust, (not to be confused with the
6
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had fallen in. The testator's qualification, in the "but if" clause
attached as a condition subsequent, was that, in the event a child
of his left "no children nor child," - supposing all of the exist-
ing and possible after-born grandchildren by one of his children
predeceased the life tenant parent, - the share went then to the
life tenant's heirs otherwise. In other words, the testator desired
to protect the children of the life tenant, by giving them a re-
mainder in explicit language, failing which the undivided share
was to pass to the stock of the life tenant generally.
42
The crucial question in the case is the issue as to the nature
of the remainders in the undivided shares, given to the respective
classes of grandchildren. One alternative possibility is that the
members in each class took merely contingent interests,43 which
vested only upon their surviving the life tenant parent, - a view
adopted by the Circuit Court" and approved, sub silentio, by the
Rule against Perpetuities), strikes down the postponement clause in instances
where such postponement may possibly extend beyond lives in being and
twenty-one years. KALEs, op. ct. supra n. 30, § 737. No West Virginia
decision- exists, but see Cowherd v. lleming, 84 W. Va. 227, 232, 100 S. E.
84, 86 (1919), where the court refused to discusl the point.
42 Cf. the similar contention often raised as. to the meaning of the word
"heirs", Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 385,' istances where an estate is
left "to the testator's son A for life; with remainder to A's children in fee;
and in default thereof, to the heirs of the testator." Where A is the sole
heir at law, it has been plausibly suggested in the decisions that the testator
intended (as a sort of partial entail) to protect the life tenant's children by
such a specific gift, failing which children he devised to the life tenant's
other stock. In short, A's children are to be let in as a new stock, before
the testator throws it open to A's stock generally. This is exactly what was
done in clause XV of the Davis will However, the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation makes the clause now become, "A for life; remainder to the heirs of
A"
43 The best argument for so holding is set forth in GRAY, o3. cit. supra n.
19, §§ 104-105: "Suppose, for instance, a gift to A for lifA, remainder to B
and his heirs, but if B dies before the determination of the particular estate,
then to C and his heirs. Here, if the condition ever affects B's estate at all,
it will prevent it from coming into possession. . . If the law looked on
vested and contingent interests with an impartial eye, it would seem that such
remainders should be held contingent. A condition which may prevent an
estate coming into possession, but which can never divest it after it has come
into possession, is a condition in its nature precedent rather than subsequent.
But the preference of the law for vested interests has prevented this view be-
ing adopted." See Bingham, Common Law Remainders (1907) 5 MCH. L.
REv. 497, 507.
44Becord, p. 69: "If the five grandchildren . .. .took vested interests as
of the date of his death, they would have the right to alien . . . . the same
.... during their life-time. Not one ever attempted to dispose of same.
The will says that if Mrs. Elkins would die without leaving a child the trust
fund would go to her legal heirs. Naturally it could not go to her legal heirs
if it had been and could be legally disposed of. If the five Elkins children
had no right to alien or dispose of the property they never had any vested
interest." The brief of counsel for appellant National Savings and Trust
Company (pp. 47-56) adequately deals with the court's reasoning in this
regard.
7
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Supreme Court of Appeals.4" The other alternative theory must
be that each grandchild already existing, and each possible after-
born grandchild immediately upon birth, took vested interests,
subject to be divested by the precise operation4 of the testator's
condition subsequent, namely, that all predeceased the life tenant
parent, - with a gift over then to the life tenant's other heirs, by
way of shifting executory bequest. So phrased, the state of the
title in the present litigation is, briefly, in trust for Irs. Hallie
Elkins for life, as tenant in common; vested remainder in fee to
her children living at the testator's death, with contingent re-
mainder in fee to any possible after-born child; subject to a shift-
ing executory bequest in fee in favor of her heirs generally, if all
her children predeceased her. To recapitulate more succinctly,
the hypotheses may be stated in this fashion:
1. Mrs. Elkins for life; contingent remainder in fee to
such of her children as survive her; if none survive, contingent
remainder in fee to her heirs generally; reversion in fee to
the testator.
2. Mrs. Elkins for life; vested remainder in fee in her
children; subject to a shifting executory bequest in fee to her
heirs, if no children survive.
At common law, while there was no great difference in substance
in these remainders given, - whichever theory be followed, -
very practical differences in result flowed therefrom. If, in the
first instance, the life tenant made a tortious feoffment, the con-
tingent remainder to the children was smashed; in the other, the
children might come in at once after the tortious livery, having
as they did an indestructible vested interest. 47  Similarly, in the
former case, the children had no alienable interest, the contrary
being true in the latter.4  To-day, the chief importance might
lie in the problem of acceleration of the remainders. If the future
interests be contingent, the renouncing of her share by the life
tenant would in principle create merely an intestacy as to her life
45 175 S. E. 611, 614: "Only one issue arises upon this appeal: did the lower
court err in excluding the infant appellant from the class described as ' child-
ren' in paragraph XV .... "
46 Conditions subsequent are strictly construed. KALES, op. cit. supra n.
30, § 596.
47 FEmANE, op. cit. supra n. 11, at 288.
48 Of course, these are ffeely alienable at present, W. VA. REV. CODE (1931),
c. 36, art. 1, § 9.
8
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estate.49 On the other hand, assuming the remainders vested, had
MFrs. Elkins renounced in 1916, her children would at once have
taken,5" subject to being divested in the later event all predeceased
her.
These facts bring the present case very close to the shadowy
boundary line between vested and contingent remainders. If the
testator intended to limit his bounty solely to such of the grand-
children as survived Mrs. Elkins, the remainder was clearly con-
tingent. Both the trial and appellate courts would then be cor-
rect in holding that the predeceased children took nothing. As-
suming the correctness of classifying her grandchild, Stephen B.
Elkins, III., (the testator's great-grandson), as a "child" of Mrs.
Elkins, the division three-ways among her two real children, (Mrs.
Hitt and Davis Elkins), and such grandchild, as decreed in the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals, would be irrefragable.
But, taking the other line of approach, were the limitation given
to Mrs. Elkins' children vested, (subject to being divested by a
condition subsequent, which in fact never operated), a sharply
contrasting consequence must follow. The vested interest of each
predeceased child of the life tenant will pass to his respective
legatees." Stephen B. Elkins, III., will take as a legatee under
the will of his deceased father, Blaine Elkins, and not as a re-
mainderman under that of his great-grandfather, the testator
herein. In short, there will be a division five-ways, among all of
the children of Mrs. Elkins or their legatees.
It is submitted that the theory of vested interests in remainder
is the sounder view in the Davis Will Case, both on principle and
after examination of the authorities. Starting with the pre-
sumption in favor of vesting,5 2 there are here words importing
the gift of an absolute interest to the children of the life tenant:
the inference is one of vested remainder. Next, a proviso is added
which may possibly defeat the gift, but the qualification is set
forth as a condition subsequent: as such, it must operate to divest
49 Compton v. Rixey's Ex'rs, 124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651, 5 A. L. R. 465
(1919); contra, American National Bank v. Chapin, 130 Va. 1, 107 S. E. 636,
17 A. L. R. 304 (1921). But see Simes, The Acceleration of Future Interests
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 659; In re Sir Walter Scott [1911] 2 Ch. D. 374.
50 KALES, op. cit. supra n. 30, § 599. Eavestaff v. Austin, 19 Beav. 591,
52 Eng. Rep. R. 480 (1854). Where the limitations read: "A for life, and
at A's death, then to B in fee," the italicized phrase means only, "at the
termination of A's estate, whenever that happens." All authorities so hold.
51 RESTATEMENT OP PROPERTY, Tentative Draft No. 4, Part III, Future
Interests (Am. L. Inst. 1933) § 206.
52 1 TiFPAxy, REAL PROPERTY (1920) § 138.
9
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some vested interest already given. Finally, the desires of the
testator, "patriarchal in design," would seem to favor a division
of his vast estate among all of his grandchildren, particularly
those living and known to him before his death, - save in the one
remote contingency that all of one branch predeceased the desig-
nated life tenant. Viewed from this angle, the present decision
would seem untenable.
Granted, however, the remainder to the class of grandchildren
was wholly contingent upon surviving the life tenant, it is at least
arguable that the great-grandson, (Stephen" B. Elkins, III.),
should take by purchase under the limitation in question. Surely
the testator never anticipated that his great-grandson was to be
disinherited, merely through the fortuitous chance of the grand-
son predeceasing the testator's daughter: it was an unlikely con-
tingency to which in all probability his mind never adverted. His
carefully-drafted testament manifested a general plan, incom-
pletely -expressed as to this one mishap.53 While one is treading
on dangerous ground in practically rewriting the terms of the gift,
so as to take care of the great-grandson, the gap in the will is so
small that courts might properly be entrusted with a wise dis-
cretion to bridge it over. Nevertheless, it seems almost incredible
that a court construing the instrument, immediately after the
testator's death in 1916, would have created such an estate in a
great-grandchild either by interpretation or by implication, - and
this, whether or not the remainder be held to be contingent.
It was suggested, in the briefs of counsel, that if the remainder
were contingent, the rule against perpetuities might strike down
the gift to the grandchildren. In other words, these remainders
would have to "continue contingent not merely up to her death,
but up to the age of twenty-five of her youngest child," thereby
violating the rule against remoteness of vesting. Any such con-
tention ignored, however, the -gift to the children of the income
from the life tenant's death until the invalid postponement limit
of twenty-five years of age. 4 Clearly, vesting occurred at the
death of Mrs. Elkins, and the trial court correctly so ruled.
The Davis Wl Case, embracing as it did litigation that
ranged over almost the entire field of future interests," might
's See PowmL., CASES ON FUTURE IMtREsTS (1928) 214-225.
u4 KAxr, op. cit. supra n. 30, §§ 510-513. There is a presumption of vest-
ing, arising out of the gift of the income.
5 It is interesting to note the choice of this field for scholarly research has
occasionally been criticized. See Philip Mechem, Future Interests uber ACeS
(1933) 19 IowA L. Rsv. 146: "The subject is a difficult and fascinating one;
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have furnished opportunity for complete restatement of many of
its leading doctrines. The opinions of the courts 'would thus have
settled definitely in this jurisdiction various rules as to which
West Virginia decisions are silent. Particularly is this true ag to
the blurred line between vested and contingent remainders: there
is no sharp-focus picture to guide the profession in drafting or
examining a complicated instrument creating a series of abstruse
limitations. Unquestionably, the increasingly heavy load of cases
burdening the Supreme Court of Appeals has precluded the ex-
haustive discussion of these problems, that was possible a few
decades ago. Still one must regret that the present decision serves
doubtless to confuse an already uncertain study in contingent
remainders.56
-C. C. WH.UAM5, JR.
the average student, however, neither can nor should be expected to become a
master of it .... It is a matter of common knowledge that Future Interests
is not properly a course but an obsession .... " Yet analysis of the choice
of electives by students in prominent law schools tends to indicate that the
course is consistently taken by the better students.
- Counsel for appellant urged on the Supreme Court of Appeals the author-
ity of such leading cases as Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen (Mass.) 223(1861); Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9, 34 N. E. 558 (1893); Calvert v.
Calvert, 297 Ill. 22, 130 N. E. 347 (1921); Caples v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341, 179
S. W. 856 (1915); Lantz v. Massie's Ex'r'x, 99 Va. 709, 40 S. E. 50 (1901);
and Suter v. Suter, 68 W. Va. 690, 70 S. E. 705 (1911).
These and other decisions cited would tend to indicate that the new West
Virginia doctrine is out of line with that generally prevailing in other juris-
dictions.
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